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Abstract 
The article investigates some of the most relevant legal issues that emerge in connection 
with blockchain technology and smart contracts by addressing them from a public policy 
perspective. In particular, it focuses on some under-investigated problems connected to 
some possible legal hurdles to their widespread adoption in the legal practice of business at 
the national and international levels. 
The legal analysis of blockchain and smart contracts is then employed to explore the 
more general question of how much the law needs to change in order to accommodate 
new technologies, or how much it is instead preferable to believe that the existing law is 
already capable of accommodating innovation, however radical it may be. 
I. General Framework and Premise of Legal Policy 
This work aims to take stock of the main legal issues that have emerged and 
are emerging in connection with blockchain technology and smart contracts. 
While giving account, at a descriptive level, of the laws that have already been 
approved, the focus will be mostly on the prescriptive level, ie, on how the 
legislature should arguably best tackle this novelty. I will thus question the 
appropriateness of the choices made so far by the Italian legislature, in the wake 
of a series of other legal systems which have introduced new specific rules in 
this field. On this basis, I will reflect on the direction that would be more 
appropriate for legislators to follow in the future. 
I will, therefore, give an account of the recent legislation introduced by the 
Italian legislature. I shall not, however, dwell particularly on these aspects, nor 
on the data that emerge from a comparative analysis. This is partly because 
other works already exist which are dedicated to them,1 and in general because 
 
* Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law, University of Turin. I would like to express 
my debt to the participants at the conference on Blockchain e diritto (Blockchain and Law), 
held in Turin on 30 May 2019, for their precious reflections, which have been of great help in 
drafting these pages. The following references to the Turin conference are to be understood as 
referring to this initiative. I also wish to thank Angelo Rainone for his bibliographical help. 
1 Cf in particular within R. Battaglini and M.T. Giordano eds, Blockchain e smart contract 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 2019). 
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on the subject, however new it may be, there already exists a relatively large 
amount of literature.2 Above all, I would instead devote myself to some 
considerations of legislative policy, in order to frame the subject within the more 
general framework of Italian private and public law, with particular reference to 
the private and public law of the economy. 
As I will say more extensively in the final paragraph, these considerations have 
to do with the more general question of how much the law needs to change in 
order to accommodate new technologies. The underlying hypothesis is that it is 
preferable to consider that the existing law is perfectly capable of accepting 
innovation, however radical that may be, without having to frantically try to 
catch-up with the novelty, an effort that even appears to be poised to fail.3 
The theoretical questions appear fundamental, especially in a new context 
such as the one under examination, and need to be properly addressed to endow 
also practicing lawyers with a sufficiently clear legal framework in their daily 
application of the existing rules to the matter under consideration. In other words, 
it does not seem possible to deal profitably with the issue of the law applicable 
to blockchain and smart contracts, for example,4 without posing the question: 
what is the legal context in which these innovations take place? 
In other words, despite certain positions to the contrary,5 it seems that this 
technological innovation is no exception, and just as any other innovation it 
does not actually take place in a vacuum.6 To speak of a ‘regulatory vacuum’, as 
sometimes is done regarding these areas,7 therefore seems improper.8 The idea 
 
2 Cf, for instance, A. Alù, ‘Blockchain, le principali normative nazionali al mondo’ Agenda 
Digitale (19 February 2019), available at tinyurl.com/yae4cell (last visited 7 July 2020); within 
the legal scholarship, cf, for instance, S. Blemus, ‘Law and Blockchain: A Legal Perspective on 
Current Regulatory Trends Worldwide’ Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier N°4-2017 
(December 2017). 
3 I will also not deal, if not accidentally, with cryptocurrencies and ICOs, a subject difficult 
to separate, for which many of the considerations that I will make here are, however, equally 
valid, mutatis mutandis. 
4 On which cf, for instance, C. Poncibò, ‘Smart Contract: profili di legge applicabile e scelta 
del foro’, in R. Battaglini and M.T. Giordano eds, n 1 above, 347; the Authors rightly speaks of a 
‘false problem’ in this regard. 
5 Cf, for instance, D. Mimran, ‘Spanning the Chasm: The Missing Link in Tech Regulation 
Part 1’ OECD Forum Network series on Digitalisation (26 April 2019), available at 
tinyurl.com/ya5ybfg6 (last visited 7 July 2020): ‘For three decades governments across the 
globe have created an enormous regulatory vacuum due to a profound misunderstanding of 
the magnitude of technology on society. As a result, they neglected their duty to protect society 
in the mixed reality of technology and humanity’.  
6 Cf S. Deakin and C. Markou, ‘The Law-Technology Cycle and the Future of Work’ Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper, 504 (2018): ‘technology 
never operates in a legal vacuum’. 
7 Cf eg D. Heller, ‘Initial Coin Offerings: Crowdfunding in a regulatory vacuum’ Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Realtime Economic Issues Watch (25 August 2017), 
available at tinyurl.com/y8exjxov ((last visited 7 July 2020). 
8 This seems to have been the conclusion shared by the participants at the EU Blockchain 
Observatory and Forum workshop, held in Paris on 12 December 2018 on Legal Recognition 
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of a ‘lacuna’ in the law, criticized here, inevitably implies that innovation can 
develop adequately only in the presence of ad hoc regulation: until this comes 
around, the law is unequipped. Indeed, from this perspective, existing law, 
which was thought of and written long before the emergence of the so-called 
new technologies, and especially blockchain technology, cannot be deemed capable 
of making room for innovations like these.  
In the following pages, I will first deal briefly with the question of the legal 
nature of the blockchain and smart contract, logically a priority to all the other 
ones that emerge when one reflects on the innovation in question and considers 
its main practical applications (§ II). Then, I will deal in-depth with those issues 
that, at least at the present time, appear to be the most current and most relevant 
on a systematic level concerning blockchain and smart contracts.9 Both of them, 
in fact, pose many problems of a theoretical and practical nature. Some of them 
have already found fairly precise and consolidated answers, such as those on 
applicable law and the competent court;10 others are the subject of extensive 
reflections in the world literature, such as those relating to intellectual property 
law,11 and the protection of the confidentiality of personal data.12 
In my opinion, however, there are still several aspects, to a certain extent 
lying in between blockchain and smart contracts, on which it does not appear 
that the scholarship has yet reached sufficiently consolidated conclusions, such 
as effectiveness and remedies (§ III). In some other cases, the legal scholarship 
has formulated considerations of law and public policy that lend themselves, in 
my opinion, to wide margins of criticism (§ IV). I will then deal with a series of 
still largely under-investigated problems arising in the interaction between 
blockchain and smart contracts, on the one hand, and existing law, on the other 
(§ V). Finally, I will focus on an aspect that seems to have been the subject of 
insufficient reflection so far, and therefore deserving of further investigation, 
namely the question of the practical usability of smart contracts in the legal practice 
of business at national and international levels (§ VI). Then, I will make some 
concluding remarks in the field of policy (§ VII). 
 
 
of Blockchains and Smart Contracts: cf its report, in particular 7, available at tinyurl.com/yc8kbtc4 
(last visited 7 July 2020). 
9 On the subject, among others, cf L. Parola et al, ‘Blockchain and smart contract: open 
legal questions’ I contratti, 681 (2018). 
10 On which cf C. Poncibò, n 4 above. 
11 Cf, for instance, G. Noto La Diega and J. Stacey, ‘Can Permissionless Blockchains be 
Regulated and Resolve Some of the Problems of Copyright Law?’, in M. Ragnedda and G. 
Destefanis eds, Blockchain and Web 3.0: Social, Economic, and Technological Challenges 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), forthcoming; G. Gurkaynak et al, ‘Intellectual Property Law and 
Practice in the Blockchain Realm’ 34(4) Computer Law & Security Review, 847 (2018). 
12 Cf for instance, among many, T. Buocz et al, ‘Bitcoin and the GDPR: Allocating 
Responsibility in Distributed Networks’ 35(2) Computer Law & Security Review, 182 (2019); 
L. Mörel, ‘Blockchain & Data Protection … and Why They Are Note on a Collision Course’ 26(6) 
European Review of Private Law, 825 (2018). 
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II. Brief Notes on the Legal and Economic Framework of Blockchains 
and Smart Contracts 
The response to all the theoretical and practical questions that arise 
concerning blockchain technologies and smart contracts depends on how the 
law qualifies these innovations and on the resulting general framework under 
which they are construed. 
As a first approximation, the blockchains are registers, which contain data, 
and therefore immediately raise the issue of their possible qualification or not 
as a database. Depending on whether the blockchains are public or private, the 
legal relations that one can establish with them will also change. Public 
blockchains, starting with the one par excellence, or the Bitcoin blockchain, are 
not owned by anyone. They result from the joint but uncoordinated work, on 
the one hand, of all those who use them and, on the other hand, of the nodes 
that validate the transactions, and in doing so, keep the infrastructure operating. 
The code of public blockchains is by definition open source, and the chain of 
blocks is continuously changing automatically. A forced change can only occur 
with an agreement of fifty percent plus one of the nodes, which could give rise to a 
new blockchain, but it would not change in itself the nature of a good over which 
no one can individually claim ownership titles or other rights in the broad sense. 
From this point of view, the public blockchain appears classifiable, according 
to the categories of economic theory and economic analysis of law, as a public 
good,13 being endowed with the two characters of non-rivalry and non-
excludability. Respectively, in fact, the use of a public blockchain by one subject 
does not affect the use by others, and no one can prevent others from using it, 
so much so that they are usually permissionless. 
The issue is different concerning the so-called private blockchains (typically 
permissioned). In this case, the source code and the resulting database are indeed 
objects of intellectual property by those who are the authors and hold the keys, 
and therefore they appear subjectable to intellectual property rules regarding 
databases.14 
As far as smart contracts are concerned, without dwelling here on the 
definition issues,15 I will only highlight what is most relevant from a private law 
perspective, namely that, according to the approach that seems preferable, the 
 
13 Cf T. Cowen, ‘Public Goods (entry)’ The Library of Economics and Liberty, available at 
tinyurl.com/yb5z683d (last visited 15 October 2019). 
14 On which cf eg M.J. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
15 On which I have had the opportunity to dwell extensively in other works: cf in particular 
R. de Caria, ‘Definitions of Smart Contracts. Between Law and Code’, in M. Cannarsa et al eds, 
The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Here, in line with the definition given by the 
Italian legislator, on which cf in a moment in the text, I will refer to smart contracts only in the 
narrow sense, or referring to the so-called decentralized ones, based on distributed registers. 
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agreement that actually qualifies as a contract in legal terms is typically one that 
is perfected upstream of the smart contract. From this perspective, the smart 
contract is only an instrument of (self-)execution of the contract, not a contract 
per se: the actual contract is something different, that was concluded before, 
even though maybe only a fraction of a second earlier.16 
This distinction is perhaps more difficult in the case of smart contracts 
concluded by adhesion, or even automatically by machines, but it is still 
conceptually valid even in these cases where a minimal amount of time passes 
between the formation of the will and the conclusion of the smart contract.17 
The smart contract consists in fact of software, object in turn of intellectual 
property,18 and a source of potential liability for the authors in case of 
malfunctioning. The software is intended to perform certain operations without 
the possibility of altering or stopping its operation if the conditions on which it 
depends have occurred.19 
Therefore, it seems right to argue that a smart contract is a source of 
contractual obligations, as legally valid agreements.20 However, I believe this is 
true as long as we qualify the ‘smart contract’ as a ‘synecdoche’:21 conceptually 
speaking, the smart contract does not correspond to the agreement, but 
presupposes it and constitutes a written translation of it (in computer code 
language).22 Smart contracts will be referred to as the source of the obligations 
between the parties, but these obligations arise from a will previously formed, 
which is received and formalized with the smart contract. 
Both the blockchain and the smart contracts have today received a sort of 
normative definition in the Italian legal system by Art 8-ter of the decreto 
 
16 Cf R. de Caria, ‘The Legal Meaning of Smart Contracts’ 26(6) European Review of Private 
Law, 731, 745-750 (2018). 
17 ibid; the inventor of the expression himself has publicly voiced his regret on the use of 
this expression: cf ‘Vitalin Buterik: I quite regret adopting the term ‘smart contracts’ for Ethereum’ 
Bitcoinist (14 October 2018), available at tinyurl.com/ybwtrguf (last visited 7 July 2020). 
18 Cf, for instance, the well-known provision in the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
related to computer-generated works, whose author ‘shall be taken to be the person by whom 
the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken’ (s. 9(3)). 
19 Cf A.J. Kolber, ‘Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility’ 21 
Stanford Technology Law Review, 198 (2018), for some reflections on the issue of artificial 
responsibility. Similar considerations can also be found in P. Cuccuru, ‘Blockchain ed automazione 
contrattuale. Riflessioni sugli smart contract’ La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata, 
107-119 (2017). 
20 R. de Caria, ‘The Legal Meaning’ n 16 above, 746. 
21 Cf P.G. Monateri, La sineddoche. Formule e regole nel diritto delle obbligazioni e dei 
contratti (Milano: Giuffrè, 1984). 
22 Cf, well before the rise of blockchain, T. Allen and R. Widdison, ‘Can Computers Make 
Contracts?’ 9(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 25 (1996), that dealt with the issue 
from a distance, attempting to articulate the requisites that a digital contract needs to meet in 
order to be deemed an actual agreement, in the sense of ‘meeting of the minds’. Much more 
recently, specifically on smart contracts, see, for instance, M.L. Perugini and P. Dal Checco, 
‘Introduzione agli Smart Contract’, available at tinyurl.com/yxd2ybto (last visited 7 July 2020). 
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semplificazioni.23 However, without prejudice to the general criticism of this 
regulatory choice, both in general and in its particular modalities of implementation, 
on which I will return in the concluding paragraph, such definitions do not appear 
able to give new answers to the issues of systematic framing that have confronted 
the interpreters. In fact, the Italian legislature, in its haste to regulate the new cases 
in an operation that has been appropriately defined as ‘regulatory marketing’24 
seems to have intended to create new, standalone categories. In my opinion, 
this does not make at all irrelevant the linking of these innovations to existing 
legal categories, and therefore the considerations made above remain applicable. 
 
 
III. Effectiveness and Remedies with Regard to Smart Contracts 
A first aspect to consider concerns the technical quasi-impossibility of 
stopping the self-execution of a smart contract, or in any case transferring data 
or wealth on a blockchain. In fact, even where the law prescribes them, and 
even where there is a judge who orders them, these actions require the 
spontaneous collaboration of those who hold the private keys of the wallet that 
contains the relevant data or digital wealth. The command of the judge, it is 
said, risks being blunt and ineffective.25 From a technical point of view, unless 
one puts in place a hard fork, which would compromise the underlying 
assumption of immutability of the blockchain, it is not possible to transfer 
Bitcoins to someone without the collaboration of the current owner (to be sure, 
of the person who currently holds the keys of the wallet that ‘contains’ them).26 
From this perspective, if the keys are only available in the mind of their holder, 
and the holder does not cooperate, no seizure or bailiff will ever be possible.27 
 
23 Decreto legge 14 December 2018 no 135, converted into legge 11 February 2019 no 12. 
24 For instance, by G. Finocchiaro at the conference mentioned above in Turin.  
25 See, for example, the decree by the Tribunale di Brescia, sezione specializzata imprese 
18 July 2018 no 7556, available at www.dejure.it, rejecting a company’s appeal against a notary’s 
refusal to record in the commercial register a resolution to increase capital employing the 
contribution in kind of a crypto-currency unit (in this case, of one being ‘still at an embryonic 
stage’). Making a consideration which appears extendable to any crypto-currency unit, the decree 
finds that, in this case, there is a lack of ‘suitability of the asset to be the object of aggression by 
creditors’: in fact, it is necessary to ask oneself the question of the ‘modalities of execution of a 
hypothetical attachment of the crypto-currency object of assignment, (...) in the light of the 
well-known existence of security devices with a high technological content which could make it 
impossible to expropriate them without the consent and spontaneous collaboration of the debtor’; 
for a comment in a critical sense, see. M. Bellino, ‘Società - Conferimenti in criptovalute: 
condizioni e limiti’ La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata, 54 (2019). 
26 The issue of immutability has some apparent repercussions in the field of personal data 
protection, a widely-debated topic on which see, among many, A. Giannopoulou and V. Ferrari, 
‘Distributed Data Protection and Liability on Blockchains’ Amsterdam Law School Research 
Paper, 6 (2019), available at tinyurl.com/y6qnkpdv (last visited 7 July 2020). 
27 To be sure, cases of seizure have taken place, even if they were brought against 
intermediaries or exchanges: some instances date back already to 2015 (cf ‘Pedopornografia, 
indagine sul Deep Web: sequestrata criptomoneta’ Il Corriere della Sera, available at 
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Similarly, if it is established, possibly even by a judge, that a smart contract 
contains a programming error that produces results contrary to justice, or that 
the contractual agreement on the basis of which it was written was based on an 
error or anyway on a faulty assumption,28 there is no way to stop the self-execution 
the smart contract. For the reasons set out above, it may then be technically 
impossible to remedy, with the consequence that the remedies offered abstractly 
by the law are, in fact, ineffective. If we imagine a debtor who has tokenized all 
his wealth, there are no assets on which the creditor can satisfy himself with the 
ordinary enforcement procedures, and therefore his rights end up being frustrated.  
This situation would be one of the many examples in which computer code 
is about to replace the law, with a whole series of relevant implications. In this 
case, computer code would even neutralize the practical effects of the Weberian 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. At least today, the force of cryptography 
would be more potent than what, for some centuries, has been one of the 
cornerstones of sovereignty. This would open a possible attack on sovereignty of 
a scope unknown until now.29 
To be sure, it must be recognized that the practical ineffectiveness of the 
remedies is a fact already quite common today, which in itself does not undermine 
the theoretical structure of the system.30 Already today it is possible that the 
debtors are destitute, either because they have squandered the assets constituting 
their guarantee, or because they have transferred them to third parties which 
are not possible to track or through operations that are not possible to trace, or 
for other reasons still. However, this is a matter of fact and does not in itself call 
into question the theoretical construction of law as we know it. 
Unquestionably, even the fact acquires its capacity to undermine the 
theoretical foundations where the exception is more frequent than the rule.31 In 
this case, if the problem of scalability finds a full solution and these practices reach 
massive adoption, then a theoretical rethinking could be necessary, but until 
then, the construction can withstand.  
This consideration also makes it possible to respond to the issue raised by 
some authors concerning particularly damaging provisions for one of the parties, 
contained in a smart contract. In itself, the law does not give up on the protection of 
the consumers, for example, through the recognition of the unfairness of specific 
 
tinyurl.com/ya2j4lx8 (last visited 7 July 2020); more recently, cf an order of seizure by the 
Tribunale di Firenze in June 2018. 
28 This generally refers to the theme of interpretation, on which cf M. Cannarsa, 
‘Interpretation of Contracts and Smart Contracts: Smart Interpretation or Interpretation of 
Smart Contracts?’ 26(6) European Review of Private Law, 773 (2018). 
29 On this subject, cf R. de Caria, ‘Blockchain-Based Money as the Ultimate Challenge to 
Sovereignty. Reflections from a Public Economic Law Perspective’ 6(2) European Journal of 
Comparative Law and Governance, 131 (2019). 
30 On the remedial use of coding, see L. Lessig, The Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons 
in a Connected World (New York: Random House, 2002). 
31 Cf Caterina’s speech at the conference in Turin. 
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clauses that may feature in (the contractual agreement upstream of) the smart 
contract. Of course, there may be a problem of effectiveness here too, due to 
particular practical difficulty in benefiting from a court ruling establishing such 
unfairness. However, the reasoning just expressed remains firm.32 
 
 
IV. Economic and Social Considerations 
In this paragraph, I would like to make some reflections on a public policy 
level, because some regulatory choices may depend on this. Firstly, a common 
criticism of these technologies is that of their energy-environmental impact.33 
The interesting fact is that it does not appear to be an incidental feature of 
theirs, but rather, in some way, it was programmatically inscribed in their original 
design. In fact, the incentive mechanism created, in line with game theory, through 
the proof of work, is built specifically on extremely complex mathematical 
problems, which require significant computing power to be solved and, therefore, 
inevitably involve a high expenditure of energy resources. To be sure, the high 
cost serves precisely to discourage the so-called fifty one percent attacks (ie 
attempts to gain control of more than half of a network’s hash rate), making 
them more expensive than the gain that can be made.34 
I believe, however, that we can and must overcome this objection if we consider 
the issue from a market perspective, which would provide for a reallocation of 
the negative externalities. The market will be very effective in finding a balance 
between the value of Bitcoin and energy costs, or better in factoring the latter 
into the former. When the fundamental activity of providing computational 
power to validate blocks of transactions (ie mining) should become economically 
inconvenient, this will create the incentive to find new technological solutions. 
Therefore, it appears to be a hardly unresolvable problem. 
Similar considerations apply concerning the question of the computing power 
used precisely for mining. In essence, it has been observed that, regardless of 
energy costs, this computing power could be used in a much more socially 
sustainable way, for example, in the service of research in the medical-scientific 
field.35 Also in this case, however, it does not seem that the legislature or the 
 
32 P. De Filippi and A. Wright express a different position in ‘Decentralized Blockchain 
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’, 26 (2015), available at tinyurl.com/yyom5eth 
(last visited 7 July 2020). 
33 Cf, among many, J. Truby, ‘Decarbonizing Bitcoin: Law and policy choices for reducing 
the energy consumption of Blockchain technologies and digital currencies’ 44 Energy Research 
and Social Science, 399 (2018). 
34 Cf S. Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’, 3 (2008), available at 
tinyurl.com/kkxbyss (last visited 7 July 2020): ‘To compensate for increasing hardware speed 
and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a 
moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they’re generated too fast, 
the difficulty increases’. 
35 Cf G. Boella at the Turin conference. 
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regulator can have the ‘fatal conceit’36 of knowing what is the preferable use of 
an economic resource. The Coase theorem37 remains a useful policy caveat 
against coercive reallocation of property titles or wealth, being it preferable to 
rely, for socially desirable outcomes, on the free negotiation of operators. 
The discussion is different (although the conclusion is similar) with regard 
to the problems posed by the self-executing nature of smart contracts in relation to 
the protection of the weaker party.38 Indeed smart contracts allow the stronger 
party to exercise extensive self-protection in the face of counterparty default, 
something that the law tends to look at with suspicion.39 Let us think of the fact, 
criticized by many,40 whereby car companies can automatically suspend the 
operation of a vehicle remotely if the person who bought it in installments is 
late for even a single day in settling even one installment.  
This action has been technically possible for several years now,41 and could 
be achieved even more efficiently by resorting to smart contracts. The danger 
feared is that this will end up giving the stronger parties even more effective 
weapons for the protection of their contractual interests. In essence, this 
perspective feeds the paradigm of Marxist reminiscence of the law of the strongest, 
or rather of the law as an instrument of the economically stronger classes.42 
However, I repeat here the considerations made in the previous paragraph 
concerning effectiveness. In essence, the law today in many jurisdictions provides 
for particular sets of rules to protect subjects or groups of subjects placed in a 
disadvantaged position, as is typically the case for laws to protect consumers. 
These new instruments could indeed lead to an increase in the number of 
breaches of such laws, and in many cases, it might be challenging to obtain 
adequate remedies in practice. However, in theory, consumer law, as well as 
other laws protecting the weak parties, would remain in place, so even this 
criticism does not seem to be acceptable. This seems to be true in general for all 
areas in which the law does not allow something that new technologies make it 
 
36 F. von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1988). 
37 According to which, as is well known, in the absence of transaction costs, in order to 
reach an economically efficient solution, the original allocation of property titles is indifferent.  
38 In this regard, it is worth mentioning J. Fairfield, ‘Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and 
Consumer Protection’ 71(2) Washington and Lee Law Review, 35 (2014), who expresses his 
favour for the use of smart contracts for consumer protection (in his view, the greatest obstacle 
to consumer protection is the need to go to court). 
39 On the subject, see, among many: A. Rappazzo, L’autotutela della parte nel contratto 
(Padova: CEDAM, 1999); A. Dagnino, Contributo allo studio dell’autotutela privata (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1983). 
40 Cf E. Stucchi at the conference in Turin. Cf also P. de Filippi and A. Wright, n 32 above, 
whereby the authors express skepticism about this possibility. 
41 Cf M. Corkery and J. Silver-Greenberg, ‘Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That Car’ 
The New York Times, available at tinyurl.com/y3r6yyax (last visited 7 July 2020). 
42 Cf, among many others, E. Ripepe, Alla ricerca della concezione marxista del diritto: 
con un’appendice in tema di crisi nel e del marxismo (Torino: Giappichelli, 1987). 
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particularly easy to implement, such as in the case of so-called smart wills. At 
least in the Italian legal system, such forms of wills clash with the apparently 
insurmountable prohibition of agreements as to future successions.43 
Finally, a remark that some authors make relates to the possible weakening 
of the solidarity obligation that would characterize the insurance contract in 
particular. This evolution would be an expression of a general tendency of the 
insurtech business to individualize risk assessment and consequently policies,44 
a trend that would be further increased by distributed ledger technologies. The 
result would amount to a sort of demutualization of insurance,45 to the detriment 
of policyholders who are less attractive to companies, and whose insurance costs 
are currently split, through a statistical-actuarial procedure, among the community 
of policyholders at lower risk, but who may be denied coverage in the future.46 
However, it is questionable that the insurance contract must necessarily be 
vested with this redistributive socio-economic function.47 As the best literature 
on health reform in the United States has shown,48 the most efficient solution 
from a policy perspective is not to force companies to insure non-insurable 
subjects. Therefore, the concern about the increased level of individualization of 
policies does not seem to be justified. If anything, the legislature will always be 
in a position to decide to take charge, not of the cost of the policy (through the 
general taxation, or with indirect taxation on the companies), but of the service 
(in this case, of health care) requested explicitly by its citizens, in one of the 
various forms in which this social right can be provided.49 
 
43 Cf M. Minelli, ‘Blockchain, smart contract e successioni (testamentarie): profili 
problematici e possibili soluzioni’, in R. Battaglini and M.T. Giordano eds, n 1 above. 
44 Cf D. Poletti at the Turin conference. Cf also the EIOPA study EIOPA InsurTech 
Roundtable – How technology and data are reshaping the insurance landscape, 2017, available at 
tinyurl.com/yxlsx7ox (last visited 7 July 2020). 
45 Cf, for instance, G. Boella at the conference in Turin. 
46 On the role of big data in the insurance sector, with regard to the blockchain technology, cf 
M. Mainelli and C. von Gunten, Chain Of A Lifetime: How Blockchain Technology Might Transform 
Personal Insurance (London: Z/Yen Group, 2014). 
47 For a reflection on this point, T. Baker and K.D. Logue, Insurance Law and Policy: Cases 
and Materials (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2017), 14-15. 
48 Cf, among many, The Council of Economic Advisers, ‘Deregulating Health Insurance 
Markets: Value to Market Participants’, available at tinyurl.com/y7vbzorb (last visited 7 July 2020); 
A. Monahan, ‘On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA’ 36 Journal of 
Corporation Law, 781 (2011). 
49 Cf R. Caterina at the Turin seminar. Other considerations that scholars brought forward 
(eg, Paolo Gallo at the same conference) about the links between blockchain and insurance law, 
concern the possible moral hazard that would result from the fact that the insured party is sure 
to obtain satisfaction when certain conditions occur. However, even in this case, it seems instead 
that the reduction of transaction costs that these technologies involve deserves a positive 
assessment, and that this risk is not so serious, given that in general the events from which the 
payment of a sum in favor of the insured derives are negative for them. 
On the other hand, the application of the blockchain technologies to insurance brings to 
our attention the complex issue of the lawfulness of insurance contracts on events involving 
third parties that do not have and impact on the life or property of the policyholder. Also this 
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Therefore, in conclusion, there do not appear to be well-founded arguments of 
public policy to limit, let alone prohibit the use of promising technologies such 
as those at the base of the blockchain and smart contracts. First, despite the 
possible practical difficulties that I have mentioned, the legislation already existing 
allows to satisfy all the public policy needs that the legislator wants to protect. 
Secondly, the protection of specific categories of subjects can more efficiently 




V. Interaction with Existing Public and Private Law of the Economy 
In this paragraph, I will briefly consider some issues that are particularly 
worthy of reflection for lawyers, raised by the innovations under consideration. 
A first question concerns the issue of the so called ‘heterointegration’ of the 
contract.51 By definition, the smart contract must be or for that matter is 
presumed to be complete, or at least as complete as possible, and especially on a 
technical level it does not allow room for external additions. However, the reader 
should again remember that the contractual agreement upstream of the smart 
contract will be subject to integration by the judge. The smart contract latter will 
be executed in any case upon the occurrence of certain conditions, but the 
judges will always be able – if one generally admits their heterointegrative powers 
– to review the outcome in terms of justice, and possibly to order a readjustment of 
the contractual obligations for the sake of equity or fairness.52 Once again, there 
may be a problem in terms of the effectiveness of the remedies, but on a theoretical 
level, the use of smart contracts does not appear to imply any conceptual 
revolution. In essence, already today, in the field of contracts, the law regulates 
much less than what it is recounted on the ground of ‘declamations’.53 The 
scenario would not change with this new way of executing contracts. 
 
practice is made more accessible by the new technologies in question (and here too, it seems 
possible to observe that the general principles governing insurance contracts will not cease to 
apply solely because of the emergence of these disruptive technologies). 
50 On the subject, cf the recent study by C. Solinas, Il contratto amministrato: la conformazione 
dell’operazione economica privata agli interessi generali (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 
2018); for considerations similar to those expressed in the text, about a well-known case of abuse of 
contract law, cf R. de Caria, ‘La nuova fortuna dell’abuso del diritto nella giurisprudenza di 
legittimità: la Cassazione sta “abusando dell’abuso”? Una riflessione sul piano costituzionale e 
della politica del diritto’ Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 815 (2010). 
51 On the subject, see, among many, the work of C.M. Nanna, Eterointegrazione del 
contratto e potere correttivo del giudice (Padova: CEDAM, 2010).  
52 For some considerations along these lines, see M. Verstraete, ‘The Stakes of Smart 
Contracts’ 50 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 743 (2019). 
53 On the subject cf the essays by M. Graziadei, ‘La legge, la consuetudine, il diritto tacito, 
le circostanze’, and D. Francavilla, ‘Diritto e conoscenza non linguistica. Osservazioni su origine, 
trasmissione e diffusione delle regole’, both in R. Caterina ed, La dimensione tacita del diritto 
(Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2009), 49 and 65 respectively. 
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The question of whether the complexity of the law, with its nuances and 
general clauses, can be reduced to the binary logic that governs information 
technology appears to be more insidious. The issue is, as is well known, the subject 
of very broad reflection,54 and there are some interesting attempts to reduce the 
regulation of financial markets to the blunt yes/no alternative, for example.55 For 
contract law, this seems more difficult. However, it seems that the consideration 
repeatedly made here is once again valid. In essence, one thing is the method of 
execution, automated by smart contracts, another one is the contractual agreement 
itself, where the judge will have the opportunity to highlight all the possible 
nuances of human action, including through the general clauses.  
Once again, considerations in line with what I have already reiterated should 
arguably be reached by looking at the applicability in these areas of other areas 
of the law, such as competition law.56 What is decisive for permissionless public 
blockchains is that no one controls fifty percent plus one of the nodes. Already 
today, however, since mining has become expensive, there are, as is well known, 
pools of miners, so there is a well-founded risk that an agreement of very few 
subjects that control the handful of dominant pools could compromise the 
system.57 Undoubtedly, in this scenario, competition law regulates the behavior of 
such subjects in a particularly cogent way.58 
A related issue, more fascinating but also more difficult, which can only be 
mentioned here, is what legal treatment should a so-called fifty one percent attack 
receive: is it an unlawful act, as such subject to sanctions, or not? In other words, is 
this type of attack, which is lethal to the credibility of the system, prevented only 
by technical protections geared on incentives for the participants (proof of work, 
proof of stake) which as such can change or even be violated in the case of ‘players’ 
who do not behave like a rational agent (think of the hypothetical work of a 
government that decides to do ‘whatever it takes’ to knock down the Bitcoin 
blockchain, at any cost, for political reasons). Or does a fifty-one percent attack 
also violate rules of a legal nature, and if so, which ones?  
This question seems, as I said, to be more challenging to answer, which 
brings me to the last question. 
 
54 Among many, cf C. Markou, Lex Ex Machina: The Rule of Technology in the Post-Human 
Future, forthcoming 2020; with specific reference to the contractual scope, cf H. Surden, ‘Computable 
Contracts’ 46 UC Davis Law Review, 629 (2012). 
55 This is what the Swiss startup Apiax (www.apiax.com) is committed to. 
56 Cf the writings of T. Schrepel, ‘Collusion by Blockchain and Smart Contracts’ 33 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology, 118-166 (2019); and Id, ‘Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust 
Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox’ 3 Georgetown Law Technology Review, 281 (2019). 
57 Cf G. Boella at the Turin conference. 
58 More generally, the issue of how decisions are taken within the community also deserves a 
great deal of attention from scholars, on the one hand, of public decision-making processes and, on 
the other, again of competition law, since these are clearly concerted decisions by operators at the 
same level of the market. Therefore, in my view, it is possible to categorize them as horizontal 
agreements.  
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VI. Applicability in the Light of the Current Paradigm of Business 
Law and Practice 
The last point I would like to make is one that appears to have emerged to a 
lesser extent in the technical and legal literature on the subject, but which I 
believe deserves close attention. 
One of the most commonly referenced potential fields of application of smart 
contracts is international trade.59 In fact, Uncitral and Unidroit have so far been 
quite active in promoting reflections and studies on the subject.60 
However, the aspect that I believe has received insufficient attention is that 
smart contracts are effective in removing the risk of non-execution by one party. 
They make it virtually impossible if the established conditions are met, that they 
might end up driving the parties to give up on a series of contracts that both parties 
would have an interest in concluding anyway. I am referring to all those contracts 
whereby, at the time of stipulation, one of the two parties does not have the money 
that they will have to pay when the condition upon which their payment is 
contingent actually occurs. In other words, it is quite common for economic 
operators, and certainly not in breach of any law, to simultaneously take on 
monetary obligations the total amount of which goes well beyond their total net 
worth. 
The total assets guaranteeing the debtors, based on the general rule of liability 
pursuant established by Art 2740 of the Italian civil code, may remain the same 
and even be limited, but the subject may use them as collateral for a potentially 
infinite series of different obligations, which together lead to a much higher capital 
exposure than the assets themselves. 
This scenario is perfectly physiological, especially in typical cases where the 
maturities of such obligations are different and distributed over time so that the 
debtor can count on future revenues to meet them. This mechanism performs a 
precise economic function, because it allows to multiply in some way the value 
of one’s assets, and so to succeed in assuming an extensive series of obligations, 
and so to increase the commercial traffic. In the practice of trading, companies 
every day assume payment obligations of sums that they do not own at the moment 
but trust that they will, in fact, own on maturity as a result of their cash flow. 
Parties can always establish that the debtor, when taking up the obligation, 
must already dispose of the amount that they will have to pay and keep it frozen 
at the disposal of the creditor, so that the latter can ‘automatically’ receive their 
payment upon the occurrence of the relevant conditions. Such an agreement 
 
59 Cf R. de Caria, ‘A Digital Revolution in International Trade? The International Legal 
Framework for Blockchain Technologies, Virtual Currencies and Smart Contracts: Challenges and 
Opportunities’, in Modernizing International Trade Law to Support Innovation and Sustainable 
Development. Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law. Vienna, 4-6 July 2017. Vol 4: Papers presented at the Congress, 105 (2017).  
60 Concerning the former, cf, eg, the volume referred to in the previous fn; concerning the 
latter, cf, eg, the Colloquium on Financial Markets Law held in Beijing on 29-30 March 2017. 
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can already be achieved by using a third-party trustee to act as an escrow. Smart 
contracts reproduce this mechanism, achieving the same result in practice, but 
making the intermediation of the escrow redundant, or at least partially replacing 
its role with that of the oracles.61 
The problem is that such practice leads to the immobilization of much more 
wealth and for much longer than is necessary in itself. It will, therefore, be essential 
to pay close attention, in the drafting of the smart contract, to ensure that a time 
limit is well defined within which the condition can be said to have been 
certainly fulfilled or not. Otherwise, there is the risk that the immobilization will 
last for a potentially indefinite time, ending up generating uncertainty about the 
actual owners of a significant amount of wealth (here, Ethers or Bitcoin, in the 
most typical cases), reproducing some unfortunate outcomes of the past that 
the commercial practice has had to overcome. 
Admittedly, smart contracts respond to a precise economic function, in some 
way attributable to the lack of trust on the one hand in the creditor, on the other 
hand, in the ability to obtain satisfaction for one’s claim through the ordinary 
remedies offered by the law. In some way, therefore, the smart contracts, realizing 
that ‘trustless trust’ mentioned by many62 (even if the parties must place 
considerable trust in the authors of the smart contract and possibly in some 
auditors), could actually make viable some economic transactions that otherwise 
would not be concluded, or that would be concluded only at a higher cost, 
including the cost of intermediation of trusted subjects of both parties. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there are still many cases in which the parties prefer 
to do without such guarantees, in order to reduce transaction costs, and where 
therefore the mechanism of smart contracts does not currently appear the 
preferable solution, at least in its most commonly described version. 
Moreover, similar considerations can arguably be made with reference to 
an extensive range of other contracts or contractual clauses: how to reconcile 
the automatic execution and predetermination of a payment obligation with all 
the cases in which its amount is not known at the outset? Just to give a few 
examples, let us think of non-life insurance, or of a penalty clause providing an 
increasing amount over time, or a short sale, all agreements that provide for a 
payment dependent on a particular result. In all these cases, resorting to a 
smart contract, in order to be a coherent choice, would require to block extremely 
 
61 Cf A. Egberts, ‘The Oracle Problem - An Analysis of how Blockchain Oracles Undermine 
the Advantages of Decentralized Ledger Systems’, available at tinyurl.com/y3br5lgt (last visited 7 
July 2020). In this respect, the practice of multi-sig contracts also seems to introduce the intervention 
of a third party, which at least in part mitigates the automatic character of smart contracts.  
62 Cf, eg, H. Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and M.J. Schmidt-Kessen, ‘Creating Markets in No-Trust 
Environments: The Law and Economics of Smart Contracts’ 35(1) Computer Law & Security 
Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, 69 (2019); M. Zou et al, 
‘In Code We Trust? Trustlessness and Smart Contracts in Computers and Law’ Society for 
Computers and Law Journal, 39-43 (2019). 
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high sums,63 corresponding to the worst-case scenario, but this seems utterly 
unsustainable economic-wise. 
In a hypothetical, futuristic economic scenario where Bitcoins, Ether, and 
other cryptocurrencies replace fiat coins, and where all wealth is somehow 
tokenized, I think the need would arise, in order for smart contracts to be applied 
outside a limited range of hypotheses, to find a way of allowing the same crypto-
currency units to be used several times, in a sort of practical alternative to ‘double 
spending’, which would, however, risk contradicting one of the fundamental 
principles of the blockchain environment. One way could be the stipulation of 
contractual agreements linked one to the other, in which the very creation of an 
obligation is subordinated to the actual arrival of the supply as a result of another 
contractual agreement, but at least to date, they appear rather complicated and 
cumbersome. Therefore this appears to be a problem that will require computer 
scientists and lawyers to think widely, in search of possible solutions.64 
Indeed, from the point of view taken in this paragraph, smart contracts appear 
to represent a glaring example of an attempt to ‘escape from the law’,65 in the name 
of its already well-known, and already mentioned above, replacement with computer 
code.66 However, difficulties and challenges as the one now exposed are at the 
same time proof that the transition is not necessarily so easy or, in any case, of 
such generalized potential application, as many authoritative scholars foretell.67 
 
63 With regard to insurance, this is confirmed by an example made by K. Werbach and N. 
Cornell, ‘Contracts Ex Machina’ 67 Duke Law Journal, 101, 119 (2017): ‘Consider a simple insurance 
contract under which Abby promises farmer Bob, in return for a monthly payment, a lump sum 
in the event the temperature exceeds 100 degrees for more than five straight days during the 
term of the agreement. In a traditional contracting arrangement, the parties would likely reduce 
that agreement to a writing, signed to memorialize mutual intent. If the temperature exceeded 
the threshold for six straight days and Abby failed to pay, Bob could file suit for breach, and 
present the contract as evidence. To implement a smart contract with the same terms, Abby 
and Bob would translate the provisions into software code. Each would make available sufficient 
funds to fulfill his or her side of the agreement’ (emphasis added). 
64 Technically, a solution already fully feasible today is to admit that the smart contract can be 
concluded even in the absence of funding in the wallet of the person who assumes the obligation to 
pay, and that this payment has to occur only when the condition occurs. However, either the 
main smart contract provides that the main obligation is not executed until the funding is found in 
the hands of the counterparty (and then you return to the starting point), or the obligation is still 
executed automatically, and then the smart contract loses one of its primary functions, namely 
the guarantee of certainty and automaticity of payment and the resulting disintermediation. From 
the opposite point of view, smart contracts also make the operation of the exception of non-
compliance problematic. If automated, the payment will still take place even in the presence of 
defects in the counter-performance, at least not adequately detected by an oracle. If instead, 
the payment is subject to prior verification of the absence of defects, in this case, the primary 
advantage of the mechanism of smart contracts appears again frustrated.  
65 Cf in this respect the reflections by P. De Filippi and A. Wright, n 32 above, later collected in 
their book Blockchain and the Law. The Rule of Code (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). 
66 The classic reference is to L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: 
Basic Books, 1999). 
67 Cf eg H. Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and M.J. Schmidt-Kessen, n 62 above, and already the previous 
version of their work, ‘Creating Markets in No-Trust Environments Implementing Smart Contracts 
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VII. Concluding Remarks: A Technological Revolution but not a Legal 
One 
The analysis carried out leads me to some more general considerations, 
applicable in principle in every area of the law of new technologies, and in my 
opinion, also to blockchain and smart contracts. 
Firstly, when dealing with any innovation, technological or otherwise, the 
lawyer should arguably always move from a general principle that is too often 
neglected, namely the principle of freedom or presumption of liberty.68 This 
principle, as is well known codified, with a rather questionable choice, by the 
Italian legislature in 2011,69 should always guide the interpretation of existing 
law, and should advise against considering that legislative or regulatory 
intervention is necessary to allow the operation of something that should 
already be perfectly legal in itself, until any rule to the contrary.  
From this point of view, it appears to be entirely open to criticism the choice of 
by the Italian legislature to rush to legislate in this matter. Furthermore, as has 
been correctly observed,70 in an imprecise manner, and above all by having the 
opposite effect, of paralyzing, at least temporarily, an innovation which previously 
could have been freely carried out. Now, it has been made dependent on the 
adoption of technical standards by the Agency for Digital Italy (AgID) (under 
para 4 of Art 8-ter of the above-mentioned decreto semplificazioni). 
In addition, two further severe problems can be identified: on the one hand, 
there is a significant constitutional law problem, namely that such important 
rules are entrusted to an entity removed from the circuit of democratic legitimacy, 
whose acts are difficult to frame in the sources of law system. On the other 
hand, as has rightly been said,71 the Italian legislation has violated the principle 
of technological neutrality,72 thus exposing itself to almost inevitable ageing, 
which can happen even very quickly.  
This is arguably all the more reason to rule out the need to call for a 
regulatory revolution. It has been very opportunely suggested that, at most, we 
 
in No-Trust Environments’, published as EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2017/13, 
available at tinyurl.com/yxgxy37l (last visited 7 July 2020). Very interesting considerations more in 
line with what I have expressed in the text are read in R. Pardolesi and A. Davola, ‘«Smart 
contract»: lusinghe ed equivoci dell’innovazione purchessia’ Foro italiano, V, 195 (2019). 
68 On the subject, cf Sir J. Laws, ‘The Rule of Law: The Presumption of Liberty and 
Justice’ 22(4) Judicial Review, 365 (2017); R.E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
69 Art 3 of decreto legge 13 August 2011 no 138, converted with amendments into legge 14 
September 2011 no 148. 
70 Eg by G. Finocchiaro at the Turin conference. 
71 Eg by G. Finocchiaro, F. Delfini and E. Stucchi at the Turin conference. 
72 On the subject, cf for instance W. Maxwell and M. Bourreau, ‘Technology Neutrality in 
Internet, Telecoms and Data Protection Regulation’ 21(1) Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review, 1 (2015); I.M. van der Haar, ‘Technological Neutrality; What Does it Entail?’ TILEC 
Discussion Paper (2007-2009). 
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need to reflect on the paradigm of responsibility.73 Our liability law is built around 
an always possible imputation at least by fault, while in the matter that we deal 
with, in many cases, it is not necessarily possible to find the author of an error 
(think of a bug in open source code). In any case, it will not necessarily be a 
solvent subject, against which it is therefore efficient to go.  
In any case, as I believe the analysis carried out in the previous paragraph 
shows, however revolutionary the technologies under consideration and their 
practical applications may be, the law must not be revolutionized as well. The more 
general private law categories are perfectly applicable to blockchain and smart 
contracts. In fact, they appear much more reliable and durable than the latest 
legislation because they do not violate the principle of technological neutrality.74 
As I have had the opportunity to illustrate, some typical operations made 
technically possible by blockchain and smart contracts, such as smart wills, appear 
very difficult to reconcile with the existing law, at least in Italy. Similarly, some 
clauses might be considered unfair, as well as in general, there could be a problem 
of defective formation of one party’s will, to name but a few examples of possible 
invalidity. As was said, it may be difficult, in practice, to obtain an effective remedy, 
but this also applies to many cases that have nothing to do with the new 
technologies. It does not cancel the fact that, in the abstract, the remedy in the 
legal system exists, which is what ultimately matters the most at a theoretical level. 
To conclude, the blockchain and smart contracts certainly seem to represent a 
promising field of investigation for lawyers. In particular, for those who study 
the interactions between law and the economic phenomenon, who will have the 
task of bringing out the various issues that they raise, of which I have tried here 
briefly to summarize the main ones, at least at present. However, I believe that 
the technological and economic revolution that they involve does not necessarily go 
hand in hand with a revolution in or of the law. The escape from the law, and its 
replacement by computer code, for better or for worse seems to be a long time 
coming. Or at least it does not seem that distributed ledger technologies and 
their applications will be the ones to accomplish it, because they can easily develop 
within the existing legal framework.75 
 
73 Eg G. Finocchiaro at the Turin conference. 
74 F. Delfini at the conference Turin; by this Author, cf also ‘Blockchain, Smart Contracts 
e innovazione tecnologica: l’informatica e il diritto dei contratti’ Rivista di diritto privato, 2, 
167-178 (2019). 
75 According to K. Werbach and N. Cornell, n 63 above, 148, new legal answers are warranted, 
but contract law will not change substantially: ‘We believe that smart contracts are not, even 
theoretically, a substitute for contract law. Consequently, we believe that the above views about 
contract law’s function, which appear to suggest that smart contracts could replace contract 
law, are unsatisfactory’. Cf also É. Théocharidi, ‘La conclusion des smart contracts: révolution 
ou simple adaptation?’ Revue Lamy droit des affaires, 138, 28-38 (2018), who expresses a similar 
view. A different opinion can instead be found in S. Loignon, Big Bang Blockchain. La seconde 
révolution d’Internet (Paris: Tallandier, 2017), 15, or in C. Zolynski, ‘Blockchain et smart contracts: 
premiers regards sur une technologie disruptive’ Revue de Droit Bancaire et Financier, 4 (2017). 
